Yaşar Aydın
Turkey has been debating MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s statement that ‘I will go to İmralı if necessary’ for several days now. A significant number of journalists, academics and politicians interpret this statement as Erdoğan adjusting the process or as tension within the alliance. Undoubtedly, there is a difference of opinion between the two leaders, a rift within the alliance. But whether the source of this is the ‘solution process’ is somewhat debatable.
To see more clearly what Bahçeli’s statements mean, it is useful to understand the moment the process began and its rationale:
The process began as a continuation of the US’s Middle East project. In this project, it was essential for Turkey to cooperate with the Kurds and Arabs, primarily in Syria.
The US project was shared with Ankara well before October 2024. Officials (both local and foreign) allayed the reservations of Erdoğan, Bahçeli and Öcalan and made them partners in the process. The mandatory process that began in the Middle East was attempted to be transformed into a means of opening the door to power domestically.
In this context, Erdoğan and Bahçeli framed the Turkish leg of the process not as a solution to the Kurdish issue, but as a project called ‘Terror-Free Turkey.’ They saw the success of this project as one of the guarantees of remaining in power. Erdoğan and Bahçeli approached the Kurdish issue instrumentally and took steps accordingly.
INTERPRETER BAHÇELİ
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and President Erdoğan introduced the term ‘internal fortification’ in the summer of 2024. What exactly was meant by this, and why was it mentioned at that time? What if Bahçeli had not been there? Bahçeli is the presenter of the plan written for Turkey via the Middle East. He has no disagreement with Erdoğan on this matter. Although his stance was motivated by different reasons, its impact on the nationalist camp and the Kurds was unclear. As the pieces were being rearranged in Syria, statements from Israel and the US shed light on the issue. The one-man regime would adapt to the new situation in the region, while also securing ways to remain in power.
From this point on, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, so to speak, took the reins. He spearheaded the process that began with a handshake ritual on 1 October 2024 and continued with ‘Let Öcalan come to Parliament and speak.’ However, Bahçeli, who had developed good relations with DEM officials and acknowledged Öcalan’s rights, was very unfamiliar with politics.
The MHP and media outlets close to it repeatedly referred to the issue as a ‘state project.’ The AKP and Erdoğan, meanwhile, described the policy being pursued as ‘an important threshold.’ In line with all this, Bahçeli and Erdoğan attempted to present the ‘new situation’ as their own invention; they continue to do so. Yet the reality is quite different. The two leaders are merely fulfilling the role of presenter and implementer of a process they agreed to out of necessity, expecting power in return. The script belongs to someone else; the director’s chair is occupied by the one who wrote the script.
If this is the case, that is, if it is a process mutually agreed upon by the two leaders, why is Bahçeli one step ahead?
WHERE DO THEY DIVIDE?
There are several reasons why Devlet Bahçeli, rather than Erdoğan, is the prominent figure in the process. Firstly, Bahçeli was needed to create a credible scenario that this was a state project. He emphasised this point with every prominent figure in Kurdish politics, from Öcalan to Ahmet Türk. Bahçeli’s presence was presented as the insurance policy for the process. It must be said that it was successful.
Secondly, the MHP sidelined a significant segment of society that could have potentially opposed the process. Although the MHP masses did not mobilise en masse to explain the process, they did not stand in its way. The İYİP’s outbursts had limited impact on the nationalist camp.
Although for different reasons, Bahçeli made a significant contribution, as planned, to the continuation of the expectations of both the Kurds and the nationalist camp regarding the process.
Thirdly, it was a significant barrier preventing the CHP from removing itself from the process.
Although no tangible steps have been taken by the state today, it should be noted that Bahçeli’s statements have been influential in the continuation of the process.
It appears that the process will continue through different stages until the election. We will witness each stage initiated by Bahçeli.
Yesterday’s speech by Erdoğan in Parliament also showed that there is no serious difference between them on this issue. The main source of difference and tension lies in how the regime will take shape in the coming period and how much influence each will have at the helm of the state. This conflictual alliance will continue until one of them believes they can be effective alone on the political stage.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Ya Bahçeli olmasaydı?, published in BirGün newspaper on November 20, 2025.
