Yaşar Aydın
The most discussed topic last week, however indirectly, was “what will happen after Erdoğan”. Plenty of material on the subject was provided both from within the AKP and from the Palace camp. In particular, Erdoğan’s visit to the US and the subsequent meeting with Trump took the issue much further.
In fact, the discussions that took place before and after the visit confirmed the internal regime struggle within the People’s Alliance, which we wrote about at length in BirGün. It has even been written about by the parties themselves.
There is no disagreement within the People’s Alliance about Erdoğan running again. However, it must be said that this support is conditional. A broad spectrum, from Devlet Bahçeli to HÜDAPAR, has said “yes” to Erdoğan and is now laying out the tasks that must be accomplished before the President. The most important reason for this conditional “yes” is Turkey’s headlong rush towards a post-Erdoğan era. Everyone who supports him is also presenting Erdoğan with a roadmap. This roadmap also determines Turkey’s direction, making the debate multi-dimensional and multi-sided.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement regarding the engines of the KAAN aircraft after his visit to the US sparked heated debate within the AKP. The sides emerged in the media and the bureaucracy. Old issues have been reopened. The conflict continues on that side, and it does not seem likely to end.
BEYOND FİDAN-BİLAL
The debate, which has spilled out onto the streets, has naturally attracted the attention of journalists and academics. Associate Professor Berk Esen summarised the events as follows
“The main fight within the ruling bloc is about how Turkey will take shape after Erdoğan. Will the increasingly personalised authoritarian regime remain in place (the Azerbaijan model), or will a structure emerge in which the bureaucracy and security elites come to the fore (the Russia model)?”
Let’s name it. On one side of the expressed conflict is Bilal Erdoğan, and on the other is Hakan Fidan. However, it would be incorrect to say that this struggle is only between these two and that it is an internal AKP issue. Yes, the “post-Erdoğan” era has begun, and Bilal Erdoğan is on one side. The other side/sides have the potential to change constantly. Viewing Hakan Fidan as the absolute frontrunner could lead to the misconception that the struggle will be over if he is eliminated. Because it is worth repeating that in this struggle, the MHP, BBP, HÜDAPAR, the Palace, the family, the security bureaucracy, the sects, the business world and the AKP, with all its factions, are present as parties in proportion to their power. This is why the struggle has already gone far beyond the scope of the AKP and the Palace.
Since the legitimacy they seek has been taken from Trump in the US, the family will insist on Bilal Erdoğan and continue down this path. They will try to design both the AKP and the Palace, as well as the country’s domestic and foreign policy, according to Bilal Erdoğan. While Tayyip Erdoğan is at the top of the executive branch, it is not very possible to prevent such a move. We saw this during the US visit. However, it should not be expected that the MHP, in particular, will surrender to this de facto situation. It is clear that tensions will continue over different issues, parties and names.
OPPOSITION CRACKS IT
It is inevitable for the opposition to be at one end of the struggle that involves every part of the ruling bloc and will affect the course of the country. Until now, the opposition has watched AKP and Erdoğan’s internal conflicts from the stands. It waited for both sides to crack as a result of that fight. None of the expected outcomes materialised. Without the pressure of the opposition, the ruling bloc still has the chance to survive this historic rupture. Despite being so weak and desperate, this is still possible. With the support of imperialists, the judiciary and security bureaucracy, and on top of all this, the country’s rent, it is still possible for a force to emerge. The opposite is also true.
If the opposition’s common stance and resistance continues to grow and reaches an organised and programmatic framework, Bahçeli may make his traditional statement much earlier than expected.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Kavganın hacmi AKP’den büyük, published in BirGün newspaper on October 2, 2025.
