Berkant Gültekin
Following the Fethullahist gang’s attempted military coup in 2016, Erdoğan and Bahçeli grew closer and have continued their alliance under the umbrella of the Cumhur İttifakı (The People’s Alliance) ever since. While the MHP, with the purge of Fethullahists, became the new partner in power and filled critical positions in the state, Erdoğan, with the support he received from Bahçeli, built an anti-democratic political order around himself.
The People’s Alliance is based less on an alliance between two parties with institutional functioning and more on the shared interests of a political leader who does not want to lose his power and a political tradition that sees itself as the ‘insurance of the state’. This was true yesterday and remains true today. Despite all the nationalist and Islamist rhetoric, this partnership still prioritises mutual gain. The fundamental motivation sustaining the alliance has thus far covered up differences of opinion and enabled the alliance partners to manage emerging crises.
Some of these irreconcilable differences were put on hold as ‘frozen conflicts,’ while others were managed by finding a balance point. The ‘process’ that began to take shape in October 2024, however, confronted the alliance with a more structural synchronisation problem than it had ever faced before.
When Bahçeli extended his hand to shake hands with the DEM Party ranks on 1 October last year and later invited Öcalan to Parliament, describing him as a ‘founding leader’ contrary to nationalist rhetoric, no one anticipated that the state would take such a long time to take certain steps. The aim was never to properly resolve the Kurdish issue; the very existence of the issue was denied by the ‘architect of the process.’ Yet many still believed that progress beyond the current situation was possible. The PKK’s ceremony to lay down its arms and dissolve itself was undoubtedly significant, but the hesitant stance of the political will led to the process becoming stuck at the stage of ‘legal regulation’ and ‘Imralı visit’.
Bahçeli raised the bar once again yesterday. If there is a move more surprising, if not more radical, than inviting Öcalan to Parliament, it would be Bahçeli visiting him on Imrali. It sounds quite fantastical, but yesterday Bahçeli said that, if necessary, he could go to the island on his own, taking three friends with him, to facilitate this meeting. Regarding talking to Öcalan, he said, ‘I would not shy away from sitting face to face around a table.’ Of course, Bahçeli going to İmralı is not the most likely scenario. Just as the scenario of Öcalan coming to Parliament to speak, despite his call, did not become a reality… However, such sensational words represent a strong insistence and should therefore be taken seriously.
It is natural that many are now asking, ‘Is there a problem within the People’s Alliance?’ Of course there is; but there always has been. This should not be viewed as a new situation for a structure that harbours many contradictions. It could even be said that the alliance’s components have so far managed to cool and control the tensions triggered by recent events. This is because the major common interests that created the alliance are still intact. The current will to maintain the regime also rests on these common interests. However, this partnership does not automatically create a common language and action regarding the direction the regime should take. The root cause of the current discord and increasing friction must be sought here.
The ruling bloc carries a dual dynamic within it. Opposite the common interests that keep the AKP-MHP alliance alive are different answers to the question, ‘Which way should we go?’ One is not democracy, the other is not autocracy, that much is certain. Neither Erdoğan nor Bahçeli envisage a democratic Turkey with expanded freedoms. However, the two have yet to chart a common course on the trajectory the regime will take. While Erdoğan wants a family-centred order in which the opposition, which claims power, is permanently removed from the equation, Bahçeli argues that the new authoritarian order, to be established by changing the state’s historical approach to identities, must be sustained with a relatively ‘institutional’ structure. Erdoğan’s perspective will eventually call into question the need for the MHP. Without an opposition challenging his power, there is no need to share power with another actor. Bahçeli’s perspective, however, carries serious political risks and uncertainties for Erdoğan.
Here, we must avoid the mistake of predicting the lifespan of the People’s Alliance. This is related to the growing power and social resonance of the opposition. It would also be a bold interpretation to say that Bahçeli is already winking at the CHP today. Although the MHP leader has a synchronisation problem with Erdoğan, he does not neglect to put the CHP in his crosshairs at the same time. Bahçeli’s statements addressed to his partner contain quite harsh words and accusations directed at the CHP. We saw an example of this yesterday. The alliance partners will do everything in their power until the very last moment to avoid losing what they have. The people’s hope for salvation must be pinned on their own unity and determination to fight, not on possible cracks at the top.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Cumhur’da senkron sorunu, published in BirGün newspaper on November 19, 2025.
