Politics Collective
While world leaders gathered in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, the most interesting issue for Turkey was undoubtedly the meeting between Erdoğan and Trump, along with the comments made by Washington before and after the meeting. Erdoğan, who Biden avoided meeting with diplomatically in order to maintain his own reputation, became one of Trump’s favorites during Trump’s second term. In December 2024, the AKP government, which was showered with “compliments” for its role in the overthrow of the Assad government alongside Israel, could not escape Trump’s advice to “be wise” so that Israel would not set foot in the newly established order in Syria. Indeed, while the genocide in Gaza continues, the palace regime, which maintains its economic and logistical relations with Israel, quietly supports Trump’s Gaza plan with hints of “refugee acceptance” between the lines, and has no quarrel with Tel Aviv beyond sharing spheres of influence in Syria, will clearly continue to “be wise.” But at what cost?
From what we can gather from Tom Barrack’s words before the Trump-Erdoğan meeting, the most important thing the government sincerely wanted from the White House was legitimacy, that is, open support for the regime. Likewise, this support was vital for the regime, which gave Trump his second-term gift in Syria, to be able to initiate the March 19 process internally a few months later. Barrack’s statement on March 18 that “good news will come from Turkey,” the fact that no high-level figure from the US made any visible criticism during this period, and the Economist’s explicit statement that “we need Erdoğan, we will remain silent” were the clearest expressions of this support. The palace regime’s civil coup to abolish electoral democracy in Turkey was met with silence, primarily due to its various “services,” including the change of power in Syria. Indeed, the Erdoğan administration also showed the same polite silence towards Israel and the US attacks on Iran!
Today, if we ask Barrack, Erdoğan is now seeking renewed support and legitimacy. Moreover, even before going to New York, secret meetings with Trump’s son and claims that 200 Boeing aircraft would be purchased were confirmed by the US. Barrack said that the American arms company Lockheed Martin kept Turkey afloat, while an agreement on valuable minerals was among the “gifts” that AKP members took to New York.
The AKP has always stood with the support of the US at the most critical times in its 23 years in power, including when it first came to power in 2002. However, the concessions being made openly today, the billion-dollar deals, are proof that the government has no concrete basis other than this support. That is why there is a regime that has no choice but to remain silent in the face of Trump’s insults and threats, even giving up its “van minut” performances.
However, the palace regime’s dependence on Washington cannot be explained solely by internal support. The AKP government, which tried to pass a resolution in parliament for the Iraq war in 2003, allowed its bases to be used in the 2010 invasion of Libya, and undertook the anti-Assad war for the US from 2011 to 2024, is undoubtedly being assigned a new role today in terms of encircling both Russia and Iran. The ruling regime is clearly uncomfortable with the prospect of becoming more influential in Syria and with a shift towards a system of ‘weak centers’ and autonomies favored by Israel, rather than a HTŞ-centered policy. Bahçeli’s eccentric Turkey-China-Russia statement appears to be an expression of this discomfort. Likewise, the Boeing deal, which was reflected in the media before Bahçeli’s statement had even been made, is indicative of the relationship the palace prefers to establish with the US. The conditions that allowed Turkey to act relatively ‘freely’ after 2016, even if only verbally, have now disappeared. The regime has reached out to the US for silent support for its internal operations and for a paradigm shift in Syria. Moreover, Trump’s encouragement of Zelensky to take back Crimea, our neighbor in the Black Sea, and his implication that he will provide all kinds of support, also shows the new risks that this policy of reaching out could drag Turkey into.
This week, we present to our readers the support the AKP has received from Washington over its 23 years in power, the concessions made in return for this support, and the point to which US dependency has dragged the country.
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THE WHITE HOUSE’S CHOSEN ONES
From its very establishment, the AKP was part of the “moderate Islam” project desired by the US. During the final phase of the Cold War, as part of the “Green Belt” project orchestrated by the CIA, such structures were supported in every country in the Middle East to fight the USSR through political Islam. In Afghanistan, groups like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were directly funded and armed with weapons and cash sent from the US Congress. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was financed by the US and the UK from the 1950s onwards, while the ‘Rabıta’, established by the Gulf countries to strengthen Islamism in the region, had infiltrated as far as the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs. As a result, 35,000 jihadists from 43 countries, from North Africa to Central Asia, were mobilized to fight the Soviet Union.
However, after the collapse of the USSR, by the 1990s, Washington sought ‘moderate Islamist’ structures that could lead the Islamized Middle East, rather than structures such as Al Qaeda, which had turned into the ‘monster’ of Washington’s own creation. The 2007 report “Building Moderate Muslim Networks” by the RAND Corporations, a Washington think tank, which proposed “moderate Islamism to curb radical Islamism” in 1989, was a clear indication of this need.
In terms of creating moderate Islamism in Turkey, figures such as Erdoğan and Gül were personally selected by the US. Erbakan’s Refah Party government was not preferred due to the problems it encountered in implementing neoliberal transformation and its clear stance on Israel.
However, after February 28, the “ Reformists,” Gül and Erdoğan, aware of the US’s approach, turned their backs on both Erbakan himself and his line, creating their own opportunities with promises of full commitment to neoliberalism and the West(!).
Abdurrahim Karslı, who played an active role in the founding of the AKP and is now the Chairman of the Merkez Party, provided sufficient insight into what happened during a meeting held at his home, as reported by A. Dilipak and later confirmed by Karslı himself:
“Dilipak: The AK Party is a project party. (…) After the early 90s, global powers, imperialist powers like the US, Britain, Israel, etc., started coming and going to Turkey. They started meeting with us too. From then on, we wanted to work with political Islamists in Turkey. Because political Islam was the rising trend. (…) They made an offer to Professor Erbakan, but he didn’t accept it. We will bring you to power, we will eliminate those who will cause you problems, we will provide you with the necessary financial support. (…) In return, what was expected was the enhancement of Israel’s security and the Greater Middle East project, that is, the changing of borders” (Abdürrahim Karslı: Abdurrahim Dilipak, TELE1 Archive, Youtube).
Ali Bulaç says the following about this process: “Starting in 1998, the Americans began to meet with us frequently. One would go, three would come. They asked: ‘Is a government with a strong religious base possible in Turkey?’ (…) Dilipak is a very active friend of ours. He prepared a political project that was possible for Turkey in the new era. When he gave the file he was working on to some people in Ankara, the Dilipak project emerged as the AK Party with some changes. If the Americans could have convinced him, they were thinking of implementing the project with Professor Erbakan, but he refused.” Thus, the AKP emerged as an American project that began in the 1990s, directly involving the CIA.
Reactions to Erbakan’s speech during his US visit while the Refah Party was still in power reveal that the Americans were already looking for a new Islamist leader at that time:
“Isn’t there a young leader candidate in this party?” Another diplomat closely following Turkey elaborated on the question: “For example, is it true that Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is aspiring to leadership?” –Ruşen Çakır, 1995.
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THE FIRST SIN: THE IRAQ MOTION
The first act of the AKP government, which came to power with the full support of the US, was to attempt to pass a motion in parliament supporting the invasion of Iraq. Erdoğan and Gül exerted intense pressure on MPs ahead of the resolution vote on March 1, 2003. The resolution, which the US demanded to involve Turkey in the invasion of Iraq, authorized “sending troops abroad and hosting foreign troops in Turkey” and covered 62,000 US soldiers. It would allow foreign armed forces to be temporarily stationed in Turkey for six months, with a limit of 255 aircraft and 65 helicopters; ensure that their transfer out of Turkey was completed as soon as possible; and enable the use of foreign Air and Naval Forces and special forces elements in a possible operation.
However, the wave of social opposition to the invasion of Iraq also found resonance within the AKP, resulting in a split during the vote on the authorization. This decision became one of the most effective forms of global social opposition to the war policies pursued by the US within the framework of its Greater Middle East Project, accelerated after the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001.
However, the US took its revenge for the rejected motion four months later in Iraq. On July 4, 2003, Turkish soldiers serving in Iraqi Kurdistan were arrested by American troops and had sacks placed over their heads in an attempt by Washington to humiliate Turkey in response to its rejection of the motion. Just as today, the ruling camp remained silent about the events at that time.
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U.S.-BACKED PURGES WITHIN THE STATE
The rejection of the motion in 2003 increased US concerns about Turkey. These concerns, revealed in the Wikileaks documents that emerged in the 2010s, included, according to the Americans, the relatively democratic environment in Turkey, the “inexperience of the AKP,” and concerns within the state about the US invasion of Iraq. Eliminating the democratic environment in Turkey was one of the primary moves, and this was primarily attempted through constitutional amendments. Similarly, Paul Bernard Henze, former CIA chief for Turkey, stated the following on this subject in his 2006 report on Turkey submitted to the White House: “We cannot be sure that Turkey in its current form will stand by American policies. The founders of the country kept the control mechanism very tight. When we convince the government, the parliament stands in our way; when we convince the parliament, the army stands in our way; when we convince the army, the judiciary stands in our way. If it is in America’s interest to establish a federal state in Turkey, then a presidential system that brings the judiciary, the army, the parliament, and the government under one authority must be adopted, without fail and as a priority. Convincing one person will be easier than convincing a structure that checks and balances itself. If that person hesitates to help American interests, dismantling a structure built around one person will not be a problem for America.
All kinds of support would be given to help the AKP overcome its inexperience, but the elimination of factions within the military and judiciary that were hesitant toward the US was a more pressing issue. It was recommended that Atlanticist and conservative figures like Özkök be promoted within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). To achieve this transformation within the military, the AKP, which came to power with US support, launched the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations, orchestrated for years from Pennsylvania itself by the Fethullahist organization. The target was the elimination of Eurasianist factions within the military, judiciary, MIT, media, and politics, using the pretext of counterinsurgency and coup attempts in Turkey. Indeed, the Ergenekon and AKP closure trials, which took place simultaneously, had turned the tension within the state into a standoff. During this period, a police official visiting the American embassy explained to the Americans that figures such as Balbay, Tolon, and Eruygun had been detained in the Ergenekon trial as retaliation for the closure case. Wikileaks documents clearly reveal the American ambassador’s support for these trials and the purge process in his discussions with Washington:
“Whatever the outcome, the fact that high-ranking retired officers accused of serious crimes against the government have been detained for the first time, and that the military has accepted this, could play an important role in deterring future coup plotters and weakening the iron grip of the deep state’s elites on Turkey’s state institutions.” (Ross Wilson, US Ambassador to Ankara at the time, 2008)
Indeed, in a briefing to the FBI, the US Embassy in Ankara argued that the Ergenekon operations should be supported, seeking the views of Halil Berktay, Murat Belge, and Şevket Pamuk on the process. The U.S.’s full support during this period was intended to prevent a repeat of the 2003 incident. Indeed, by 2011, this support would bear fruit in the form of positive results on the Syrian border.
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JIHADISTS IN SYRIA, A SINGLE MAN IN TURKEY
Following the 2003 accident, the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations saw the AKP-Fethullahists alliance purge elements within the state that were hesitant towards the US, allowing pro-American and Islamist factions to take over. , thanks to the referendum passed by the same alliance, the government’s control over the judiciary increased, and Turkey now had all the means to fully support the US’s new adventures. Indeed, the Arab Spring that erupted in 2010 turned into an opportunity to install pro-American-Islamist governments in the Middle East and North Africa, and the AKP government had already begun to spin this into fantasies of “neo-Ottomanism” and a “green Middle East under Turkey’s leadership.” However, the plan backfired: the “ Rabia” regime could not hold on to power in Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood failed again in Tunisia. In Libya and Syria, the Islamist opposition failed to gain the desired power. When the Arab Spring proved ineffective, NATO autumn occurred in these two countries. The US, together with Italy, France, and the UK, bombed Gaddafi’s Libya, and Turkey opened its base in Izmir to facilitate the air strikes. In Syria, a more devious roadmap would be followed.
The inability of the Sunni opposition in Syria to gain a realistic base against the Assad regime, coupled with the US’s unwillingness to embark on a new occupation due to the material and political burden created by the invasion of Iraq, led to a proxy war in Syria involving Turkey and Qatar.
The Bread Protests, which began in Syria, one of the countries where the regional uprisings were weakest, whetted the appetite of Obama and Clinton, and the task of direct intervention and central patrols was handed over to the Erdogan government. Even before the protests took on an armed dimension, refugee camps were set up on the Hatay border. The plan of the then-Foreign Ministers Clinton and Davutoğlu was to use the number of people arriving at these camps, once it exceeded a certain level, as justification for the occupation. However, the plans did not go as expected. When the Assad government did not respond as harshly as expected to the uprisings, a new strategy was developed to escalate the civil war. Turkey’s borders with both Iraq and Syria were opened to provide logistical support to jihadists.
The Iraqi Al-Qaeda, founded by Sunni jihadists who had been dismissed from all government positions on the grounds of collaborating with Saddam by decision of the provisional government established by the Americans in the 2001 Iraq war and radicalized by torture in American prisons, was given every kind of support to overthrow the Arab Alawite Assad government in Syria. Jihadist gangs passing from Iraq to Syria via Turkey began clashes with regime forces, rapidly dragging the process into a bloody sectarian civil war. The intervention, which grew with attacks directly targeting the Assad government in partnership between the US and the AKP, failed to achieve its goal within the desired timeframe due to Russia’s involvement in the war, and Syria entered a civil war that would last 14 years.
While the civil war raged on, Al-Qaeda structures brought in from Iraq radicalized within themselves, first giving rise to the Al-Nusra Front, then ISIS. ISIS, like Al-Qaeda, which carried out the September 11 attacks and was also a product of American military and intelligence activities during the same period of the Afghanistan invasion, carried jihadist barbarism beyond Syria’s borders, carrying out terrorist attacks in Turkey, France, and Germany. During the 2015 general elections, ISIS and Kurdistan Freedom Hawks attacks played a significant role in suppressing the opposition and driving them off the streets amid the regional war context in Turkey. Subsequently, this bloody process, coupled with the July 15 coup attempt resulting from conflicts within the ruling coalition, brought about a regime change in Turkey through a fraudulent referendum under a state of emergency. Even before the desired change of power occurred in Syria, Henze’s plan had been finalized in Turkey, and as a result of Ankara’s unprecedented involvement with jihadists, Turkey had transitioned to a one-man regime.
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AMERICAN APPROVAL FROM THE 2023 ELECTIONS TO MARCH 19
Although the palace regime has been an ally that the US has refrained from openly supporting since 2016 due to crises such as the S-400, the AKP-MHP alliance has continued to be supported as the strongest actor capable of sustaining the imperialist policies and neoliberal regime imposed by the US. Likewise, in the 2023 election, one of the most critical elections in the history of the republic, which is being proven anew with every new development today, the US was confident in the AKP’s continuity on many different issues. As we later learned, in May 2023, military preparations were underway in Idlib for HTŞ operations that would take place a year later and lead to Assad’s downfall. Ten months after the elections, on October 7, Israel would launch a bloody occupation of the Middle East, and Turkey’s silent support was vital for operations that would encircle Iran. It was impossible to endure a repeat of the discord that occurred 22 years ago with the parliamentary vote. Furthermore, regarding the issue of refugees, which had become a serious internal pressure point for both Europe and the US, Erdoğan was openly giving assurances before the election, saying they would take more. Indeed, the opposition’s mistakes, which gifted them the election, and the “suspicions” surrounding the election, which Trump recently recalled, allowed the AKP-MHP alliance to gain the legitimacy it sought domestically and embark on moves to cement the regime in the new Middle Eastern reality. The opposition purge that began on March 19 could develop into a civil coup, not only because of the government’s control over the state and the relative weakness of the opposition, but also because of the open support and “approval” of Barrack and Trump. Barack’s statements on March 18 that “great news will come from Turkey,” Trump’s compliments to Erdoğan while actions were ongoing in Turkey, and the Israeli negotiations were proof of Washington’s open support. Today, for this support to continue, it will become increasingly costly for the regime to maintain its external legitimacy, from billion-dollar trade agreements to natural gas trade whose cost will be borne by the people, to the silent support of the US-Israel on the targets of Iran, Palestine, and Russia. Erdoğan’s inability to make even symbolic Shanghai or van minut outbursts is a result of the regime’s lack of support and weakness among the people. The support coming from their king, Trump, will not be enough to cope with public opposition, but preventing the country from being dragged further into hell in order to maintain this support will remain one of the most important responsibilities in our struggle for the homeland and the future.
Among the compromises made by the AKP-MHP alliance for external support, perhaps the most long-term and costly has been the refugee crisis. Erdoğan took on the role of “savior” so that the millions of migrants fleeing the destruction wrought by the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria would not become a problem threatening the Western countries that engineered the war. Turkey was positioned as a buffer zone for refugees for the imperialist centers that created the war. Turkey, bent inward toward the Middle East, is also being repositioned as a buffer country in this sense in its relations with the West. Its main function is now to prevent the mass flow of refugees from crossing into Europe. To this end, bilateral agreements have been signed whereby Turkey is paid to keep refugees. In addition, many organizations from Europe and the US are continuing parallel work in the civil society sphere by establishing and funding associations working on the integration of refugees in Turkey. The AKP sees this as financial support, while also using it as one of its most important bargaining chips with the West. On the other hand, migrants, who are also seen as a source of cheap labor for capital, are viewed as an invaluable opportunity for an export-based model. In this sense, Turkey has become a country that provides brain drain for Europe, while also taking on the role of a border country that prevents mass migration. This migrant policy, which has taken shape as a new form of exploitation in the 21st century, also carries significant risks for Turkey’s future.
SOLUTIONS FOR THE PILE OF PROBLEMS
Turkey has clearly been turned into a migrant reservoir in line with the preferences of the US and Europe. This is also a policy consistent with the AKP’s undertaking of the task of transforming the regime into a political Islamist one. The positioning of migrants in Turkey today, while undoubtedly related to the search for a humanitarian way out in the face of the suffering caused by the war, cannot be considered independently of the jihadist generation project. The settlement process, which began with jihadist fighter camps, was subsequently replicated in the form of jihadist ghettos being established in many parts of the country. This also means recruiting a support force for the government’s Islamization project. On the other hand, this migration policy, managed by the AKP, is also laying the groundwork for a demographic transformation in the long term.
Obama’s Baseball Bat, Trump’s Letter In the past, the AKP government turned US sanctions against Iran into a source of profit for itself. Through shadowy figures such as Reza Zarrab, who was almost declared a “folk hero,” the government tried to circumvent the sanctions via Halk Bank in order to transfer funds from Iranian institutions abroad. On the one hand, Turkey acquiesced to the US’s economic pressure on Iran, while on the other hand, it circumvented these sanctions in ways that generated profit and bribery. When the scandal broke, it was revealed that Reza Zarrab had bribed ministers in Turkey, sanctions discussions regarding Halk Bank and Turkey began in the US Congress, and Reza Zarrab was imprisoned in the US. During this process, individuals appointed by the government traveled to the US with suitcases full of cash under the pretext of supporting Trump’s election campaign, and anti-Trump factions within the US leaked these secret meetings. In addition to the Halk Bank crisis, the government’s attempts to create room for maneuver in the Syrian conflict after 2016 turned into a threat hanging over its head like the sword of Damocles. Taking advantage of Trump’s lack of initiative in Syria during his first term, the regime reinforced its anti-YPG stance with a short-term alignment with Russia. In the post-July 15 climate, the government needed this maneuvering room to convince its supporters of a baseless anti-US stance and to fill the vacancies left by Fethullahists within the state with segments represented by the MHP and Aydınlıkçılar. However, the only concrete outcome of this period was the government’s purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, using the delay in F-35 negotiations as an excuse. On that day, in the vacuum created by Trump’s “bagful of incentives,” the government spoke extensively about the Shanghai Five and the evils of the US, but in the following period, faced with the possibility of sanctions from the US Congress against both the S-400 and Halk Bank, it quickly reverted to its old position. Another test for the government with Trump was the case of Pastor Brunson. Brunson, who was imprisoned on charges of missionary work and espionage and who is also important to Evangelicals in the US, became a domestic political issue for Trump, who drew support from the most radical elements of this group. Trump wrote a historic letter to Erdoğan, intervening in the Turkish court’s decision and demanding Brunson’s release. The result of the letter, in which the US president openly told the Turkish president not to “be stupid” and that he would “destroy Turkey’s economy,” was that the court decision was overturned and Brunson was released. A similar crisis occurred in 2012 when Obama called Erdoğan regarding U.S. demands in Syria and posed for a photo with a baseball bat in his hand. At a time when the two leaders were not openly confronting each other, the Obama administration was sending a message to the Turkish government that it was in line with the ruling party.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Hatırlatmalar | Washington’un ‘destekleriyle’ yaşayan rejim, published in BirGün newspaper on September 28, 2025.
