Yusuf Tuna Koç
US Special Representative for the Middle East Tom Barrack made a statement last week in Lebanon implying that Lebanon would be next if Hezbollah was not disarmed. Following Barrack’s show of force, attention turned to Beirut after the Gaza agreement, with comments suggesting that the regional war would continue through Lebanon after Palestine.
We spoke with academic Ümit Fırat Açıkgöz from the American University of Beirut about the possibility of Israel invading Lebanon, Hezbollah’s situation after 7 October, and Zionism’s ultimate regional goals.
Tom Barrack’s latest statements have led to comments that Lebanon is next in line after Syria and Palestine. Could there be a more comprehensive attack by Israel than in the past, provided that Hezbollah is not eliminated in Lebanon? Are Barrack’s statements a threat of this?
This issue has been a scenario discussed in Lebanon for weeks, even before Barrack’s statements. In fact, this possibility has always existed since the Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire in November 2024. If Israel believes that Hezbollah has not fulfilled the terms of the ceasefire, or if it uses this as an excuse, it could launch another attack. Israel has never withdrawn from five points in Lebanon and has always used this as a means of pressure. However, in recent weeks, this scenario has become increasingly serious. There are two factors at play here. One is the recent ceasefire in Gaza. After the ceasefire was signed in Gaza, many commentators said that Israel would turn its attention to Lebanon and, at some point, would want to attack Lebanon or Hezbollah under some pretext. As we all know, the Gaza war is what has kept the Netanyahu government in power for the past two years. After 7 October, no one expected this government to last this long, but they are still in office, and perhaps the only way to extend this strange, fragile, most right-wing government in Israeli history beyond the next elections is, according to some, through war and a state of emergency. That is why the only scenario ahead in Lebanon is war. Because Trump made a significant investment in the Gaza issue, reluctantly bringing Netanyahu to the ceasefire table and getting him to sign. We do not know if the ceasefire will hold or be sustainable; its failure is also a serious possibility. However, if the ceasefire is sustainable, he will try to maintain his fragile coalition by turning his attention to Lebanon.
The excuse in Lebanon is Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm. This is a long story, essentially based on different interpretations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. According to some, this resolution and the ceasefire require Hezbollah to completely disarm. According to others – and Hezbollah interprets it this way – this disarmament will only affect the area south of Lebanon’s Litani River. In other words, Hezbollah will withdraw its weapons and military structure to the north of this river. However, Israel and anti-Hezbollah political figures in Lebanon interpret this resolution as requiring Hezbollah to completely disarm. In fact, Hezbollah’s disarmament is demanded on the grounds of Lebanon’s internal dynamics, the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended the civil war, and many other reasons. However, from Israel’s perspective, the issue is the different interpretations of the Security Council resolution.
According to the Lebanese army, over 80 % of Hezbollah’s military presence south of the Litani River has been displaced in the past year, with control and weapons largely passing to the army. It was announced that only a few missile launchers and a minimal amount of military infrastructure remain. This situation has been confirmed by other observers. However, there is a demand for complete disarmament on Hezbollah, created by pressure from the US, apart from Israel, and by internal Lebanese dynamics. At the beginning of September, the Lebanese government took such a decision without mentioning Hezbollah by name; it called for the end of non-state military structures and the transfer of weapons to the state. Although Lebanon was overshadowed by the Gaza war, it experienced weeks of serious tension following this decision because Hezbollah rejected it and refused to comply. Hezbollah supporters staged demonstrations in the streets of Beirut. Although the government’s plan envisaged serious results by the end of the year, it now seems to have been swept under the carpet due to Hezbollah’s counter-move and the threat of a near-covert civil war. Israel could use this as an excuse to launch another attack, claiming that ‘the Lebanese army is not complying with the requirements of the ceasefire.’ Are Barrack’s statements a threat? Yes. However, it was Israel, long before Barrack, that actually made this threat. We do not know how likely this threat is to materialise, but a substantial threat looms before us.
Following the losses suffered by the resistance axis in Syria and Palestine, can Hezbollah and its ally Iran resist Israel’s military pressure in Lebanon? Can Hezbollah maintain the same level of resistance in Lebanese and Middle Eastern politics after Nasrallah?
That depends on the nature of the pressure. Will it be an attack consisting of air strikes and ground operations along the border, as in the autumn of 2024? We are not sure how far that would go. Or will it be an Israeli military operation that goes as far as Beirut itself to completely disarm Hezbollah? The second scenario, while not impossible, is quite challenging. We are not talking about a narrow strip like Gaza. Even if its military presence is displaced, we can assume that Hezbollah still has a significant presence in southern Lebanon, which would require crossing north of the Litani River. Because if you want to finish Hezbollah militarily, you will have to come to Beirut, and to get to Beirut, you will have to pass through areas that Hezbollah can threaten with its remaining missiles and engage in urban warfare. This is quite difficult. Considering what Israel has done in the last two years, one might say that nothing is impossible, but on the other hand, making such a decision does not seem so easy. Compared to 2006 or even the start of the 2024 war, Hezbollah is in decline in many ways. The loss of almost its entire leadership cadre was a major blow. We are talking about a movement that has suffered a very serious decline, both militarily and morally. But forcing this movement to lay down all its arms without its own initiative and consent would require a bloody process. The Lebanese army cannot risk this in Lebanon, and I am not sure Israel would dare to do so. Hezbollah may not be able to show the same resistance it did before 2024, but it will certainly not be easy for Israel either.
What is the ultimate goal of Israeli aggression in the region, which encompasses Palestine, Syria, parts of Lebanon and Iran after 7 October?
Actually, the biggest problem is that there seems to be no ultimate goal. This is the longest war in Israeli history. They said the ultimate goal of this war in Gaza was to destroy Hamas, and they have not been able to do so for two years. They have caused enormous damage, eliminated the leadership, and estimates vary as to how many fighters have been killed, but Hamas is still there and continues to exist abroad, and Israel had to sit down and negotiate to get all its prisoners back. That is the story in Gaza. As for Syria, Lebanon and Iran, I am not sure whether the Netanyahu government has a final objective. At the end of the first year of the war, this issue was also being debated within Israel: ‘Where will we stop?’ Moreover, since then, the area of attack has expanded considerably, with a 12-day war against Iran and a ground invasion of Lebanon. The ultimate goal is to create weak regimes in the region that will recognise Israel and be neutralised, and to dominate the region through these regimes. However, since its establishment, Israel’s ultimate goal has been to become the leading country in the region by making peace with Arab countries on its own terms. I don’t think there has been a change here; it has never been as reckless as it has been in the last two years, but apart from that, I don’t see an ultimate goal.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Netanyahu’nun savaşa ihtiyacı var, published in BirGün newspaper on October 26, 2025.
