Berkant Gültekin
Bahçeli’s proposal for a Turkey-Russia-China (TRÇ) alliance does not seem to have had much impact in the government’s circles. Leaving aside the excitement it generated in Eurasianist circles, this call had no significant impact on the country’s general political debates. In fact, the alliance partner Erdoğan said he did not even follow the issue and said, ‘May it be auspicious.’ Of course, such a thing is impossible.
Even if it is not an anti-US and anti-Israel discourse, the fact that the proposal for cooperation with Russia and China against the Western camp comes from the MHP is a huge irony from a historical perspective. The socialist bloc collapsed, and China may have built a different order, but in the 1970s, when the Cold War continued to exert its influence, revolutionaries who fought against US imperialism and defended Palestinian land against the Zionist siege, were targeted with cries of ‘Communists to Moscow!’, are now winking at Moscow and Beijing. Let’s at least note this as a ‘twist of history’.
There have been many developments that have turned the heads of the Ülkücü movement recently. Bahçeli’s TRÇ proposal after calling Öcalan to Parliament must be challenging the existing orthodoxy considerably. Heads must have been scratched, wondering, ‘Those words about the US and Israel are fine, but what do Russia and China have to do with it?’ However, one should not expect a political movement with these characteristics to discuss anything at such length. The MHP’s unwritten ‘leader-organisation-doctrine’ rule sanctifies the word of the top leader. The organisation unconditionally obeys the leader. The reason why Öcalan’s statement did not cause any turmoil within the movement, contrary to some expectations, is because there is no opposition potential within the party that could challenge this rule. The reaction of the voter base is a separate issue.
NO INTENTION TO CHANGE COURSE
The TRÇ alliance proposal can be debated politically from several different angles. First, it must be said that despite their constant patriotic rhetoric, neither the AKP nor the MHP have had an anti-imperialist perspective to date. Throughout the AKP years, Turkey’s dependence on the NATO camp increased, and despite some complications, relations with US imperialism progressed and developed. The AKP’s policy, which fundamentally diverged from that of the National Vision, supported every Western intervention in the Middle East and even took on a role in these processes. Since 2002, Turkey has never turned its face anywhere else. Erdoğan, who said ‘Turkey’s biggest problem is the CHP’s anti-American stance’ when he came to power, has not changed his line over the years. He has no intention of changing course now, as long as it is not completely ruled out. Periodic partial tensions do not change the big picture.
Erdoğan’s meeting with Trump at the White House tomorrow symbolises the continuation of the government’s positive stance towards the US since the past. Turkey’s additional customs duties on US goods were lifted ahead of the meeting. What has been reflected about the content of the meeting indicates that the US will benefit greatly from this summit. Trump has already framed Erdoğan within a certain framework days in advance by sharing information about Boeing and fighter jet sales. Despite this, the media under the government’s control will present any potential progress regarding Turkey’s acquisition of F-16s from the US and the F-35 programme as ‘Erdoğan’s great diplomatic victory’ following the meeting. Billions of dollars will go into Washington’s coffers, but the victory is ours; let’s celebrate!
Could Bahçeli be blind to this reality? Is he really so unrealistic as to suggest that a Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership could break away from the US and form a separate political alliance with Russia and China? Of course not. So the questions remain: Why did Bahçeli bring this up? On what grounds did he propose the establishment of a TRÇ alliance consisting of Turkey, Russia and China against the ‘US-Israel evil coalition’? What did these words reflect, and what message did they send to his partner and to different centres? These are the essential questions that need to be answered. If Bahçeli made these statements simply to ‘stir things up’ or just to say something, then there is nothing to discuss. There will be no follow-up, and the ‘TRC alliance’ will vanish into thin air. However, it is difficult to say that this assumption sounds plausible.
POSSIBILITIES…
There are several possibilities. One is that the AKP-MHP alliance is sending a message to the US via Bahçeli. This message also implies, ‘Do not ignore us, or we will move closer to Eurasia.’ Erdoğan had previously responded to the US distancing itself from him by signing the S-400 agreement with Russia. There is a widespread belief that Turkey can increase its bargaining power against the West with such moves. In other words, a tactic of sending signals to the other side can be employed from time to time to become a more valuable partner in the eyes of the West. Considering that Turkey’s inclusion in the F-35 programme was expected to be on the table during the Trump-Erdoğan meeting, Bahçeli’s words fit reasonably well into the timeline. We can also add to this the unease felt about developments in Syria/the Middle East and Israel’s moves in the region.
Another possibility relates to internal alliance calculations… It may not yet be a crisis or a rift, but something is building up between the AKP and the MHP. This can be seen from time to time in bureaucratic clashes, organised operations and appointments made with Erdoğan’s signature. Of course, we should avoid exaggerated and misleading comments such as ‘the alliance is cracking’ based on the current problems. The vast system they share and benefit from is still intact. However, despite everything, we must consider whether Bahçeli’s statement is ‘a scratch on the alliance board’. If that is the case, then the words he spoke today could become stepping stones for more pronounced stances in line with developments that may emerge in the long term in the balance of the alliance and politics. In other words, perhaps Bahçeli is expressing the MHP’s concerns in a politically ‘aestheticised’ manner.
We will undoubtedly learn the truth among the possibilities in time.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled TRÇ bir tercih mi, taktik mi, serzeniş mi?, published in BirGün newspaper on September 24, 2025.
