Yaşar Aydın
In Ankara, whoever we speak to about an early election date says May 2027 at the latest. The actions taken by the People’s Alliance also confirm this date. The 2026 budget, the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality indictment, the attempt to seize control of the CHP, the moves towards Mansur Yavaş, the media operations, the full agreement reached with Trump on the Middle East and the Mediterranean, including Cyprus, the design within the AKP… All of these together show that the hourglass has been turned over for the election.
It must be said that the election is more of a necessity than a choice for the AKP and Erdoğan. Both Bahçeli and Erdoğan would prefer to remain in their seats for years without an election. There is no need to even mention that the relationship they have established with all the rules and regulations of democracy is instrumental. But this is Turkey, and you cannot simply eliminate the ballot box that easily. You have to hold elections. So, the only thing to do is to bring the ballot box before the people at the right time and place. Erdoğan and Bahçeli are now preparing for this.
THE SAME OLD PATTERN
Erdoğan has played out the same scenario in almost every election he has entered. Erdoğan has a campaign package that includes the economy, religion, and domestic and foreign policy. Now he is pursuing a similar scenario.
The economy will improve: Turkey is experiencing a period of deep economic crisis, the likes of which it has not seen since the founding of the Republic. This situation has also led to a serious erosion of support for the AKP. But Erdoğan does not seem to be too concerned. He is clearly relying on the last-minute surges he has achieved in previous elections. This is why the pro-government media has been harping on about the Argentine Chamber of Deputies elections held on 25 October. President Javier Milei won the election thanks to the IMF’s support in June and the US’s expected $40 billion credit line. Erdoğan is considering the same method for Turkey and is therefore completely subservient to Trump.
The opposition must also recognise this situation and not succumb to the widespread belief that only the economy will change the government.
Finding an enemy: Erdoğan has entered all his elections by finding an enemy, both domestic and foreign. The foreign enemy is still relatively easier than the domestic one. Elections are coming up in November 2026. Netanyahu is running again. Controlled tension under US supervision would create an unparalleled opportunity for both leaders.
The domestic situation has changed somewhat. Neither the PKK nor FETÖ in the traditional sense exist anymore. While the process with PKK leader Öcalan is ongoing, the old rhetoric is no longer viable. To this must be added the need for DEM in the event of an early election decision by Parliament. Since FETÖ can no longer be presented as a threat as before, it is very clear that the government will declare the CHP an enemy. However, it is impossible for the party that founded the republic to create the same impact it achieved with the PKK and FETÖ against its most important political rival. Still, it is worth noting the espionage issue raised in the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality indictment. Although it is a weak headline, they will try to make something out of it. That leaves the Gezi protesters, socialists and democrats. But it will be very difficult to gain anything from them. It seems that the government will try to consolidate its position internally by pointing to external threats.
Continuation of the state of emergency: For the last 10 years, the AKP has entered every election as if there were a civil war going on. The state of emergency is ongoing and intensifying. The closure request from the İstanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office also shows that the CHP will face a period of pressure unlike anything it has experienced before over the next two years. The same applies to independent media and other components of social opposition.
Erdoğan is determined to go into the election under the most favourable conditions.
NO NEW PLAN
All these headlines show that Erdoğan has no new plan or roadmap in hand as he heads into his most difficult election. He will proceed with the methods he has tried before and achieved results with. But this time, he is also aware that there is a more resilient public and opposition. He is busy looking for ways and methods to resolve this.
On one side of the picture, as Ahmet Türk also stated, there is a government that has taken over all state institutions. Buldan used a similar expression. But on the other side, there is 60% of the country that is angry with the regime and the government. This figure has reached these levels for the first time. Far from falling, it is constantly accelerating upwards.
This picture should embolden the opposition. But it should not be forgotten that the existence of these people will not mean much unless they become an organised community.
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IS BAHÇELİ AN ICEBREAKER?
The two leaders met during a week when the question ‘is there a rift?’ was asked frequently. According to pro-government columnist Abdülkadir Selvi, a ‘road map’ was determined during the meeting. It is obvious that nothing will come of the road map determined during the 40-minute meeting, which included greetings and farewells. The lack of statements before and after the meeting, and its short duration, suggest that the meeting was staged more as a ‘no problem’ show than a substantive discussion. It appears that the two agreed months ago on a Middle East and Turkey plan that also had US support. Fidan and Kalın also took on a facilitating role. It seems that a division of roles regarding the implementation of the process has also been made. Bahçeli’s role has been defined as that of an icebreaker to facilitate the process. This allows Erdoğan to proceed with a safer journey. The pair also share the same view on Öcalan. Here too, Bahçeli is deliberately being pushed to the fore.
However, the harmony in the resolution process does not mean there are no contradictions or rifts between them. On the contrary, it indicates that their relationship is increasingly turning into a necessary alliance. The issue of what happens after Erdoğan is the main source of tension. Because today, there is not just an alliance between two parties and two leaders. There is now another reality, referred to as ‘the family and its circle.’ This is a new case for Turkish politics. That is why, especially on the MHP side, there are very serious doubts about the future of the relationship maintained by the two leaders. Any new situation that has not been discussed and agreed upon internally and externally is likely to widen the rift. The source of the crisis is not the ‘solution process’; today’s issue is essentially about tomorrow. But naturally, what you will do today will shape tomorrow. The issue of the regime’s future has become today’s crisis within the alliance and will continue to be so.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Saatin içindeki kum seçim için akıyor: Erdoğan’ın bir oyun planı var mı?, published in BirGün newspaper on November 17, 2025.
