Yusuf Tuna Koç
We discussed with foreign policy expert Aydın Sezer the implications of the Trump-Shara meeting at the White House for Syria, Turkey and the region, the emphasis on a new era in Tel Aviv-Ankara relations in Barrack’s latest statements, and the significance of all these developments in terms of the Terror-Free Turkey process being carried out domestically.
According to press reports, a meeting took place at the White House between al-Shara and Trump regarding the integration of the Anti-ISIS Coalition and the SDF. What does this meeting mean for the new era in US policy towards Syria?
After Assad’s overthrow, the US clearly demonstrated its support for al-Shara’s administration during the process of transition in Syria. The fact that he was welcomed at the White House less than a year into his term shows that the US considers Sharar to be the best option in Syria, and we can understand that it will continue to work with him. However, we know that within the framework of the carrot-and-stick policy, the US has certain demands in exchange for lifting various sanctions, primarily the Caesar sanctions, and securing the legitimacy of the Shara administration in the eyes of the White House. Firstly, joining the Anti-ISIS Coalition; secondly, paving the way for the integration of the Kurdish forces into the current administration; and finally, developing Israel-Syria relations and signing a security agreement, which could lead to Syria’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords at a later stage.
While doing this, the US is encouraging the SDG, with whom it has had a long-standing strategic partnership in Syria, to continue to be a guarantee for them in exchange for integrating into the Damascus administration, reminding them that they hold the strings in any problem. While supporting the integration of the Kurds under its control, it is also encouraging Shara in this direction. We can consider this a step towards legitimising the HTS government in a broader context.
Since the regime change in December, two doctrines have been frequently discussed; one advocates the establishment of a centralised government dominated by Damascus, while the other defends a model with a weak Damascus and greater independence for the Druze, Alawites and Kurds. Indeed, while Barrack initially defended the first plan, he moved closer to the “weak centre” doctrine, supported by Israel, following the massacre of Druze. Does al-Shara’s visit to the White House signify a return to the strong centre strategy?
We cannot claim that this has been fully achieved as of today, but we can say that this is the main objective. We can say that long-term stability is not possible in the short term in today’s Syrian reality, and both Israel and the US are well aware of this. Despite Western support, it will take a long time for the Damascus regime to stabilise in Syria, so the Israeli policy you mentioned does not contradict the current situation; they are aware that centralised governance in Syria will not be easily achieved. Moreover, they are aware that the issue is not solely related to relations with the US and Israel; it is a multi-actor dimension, involving Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and even Russia. Therefore, the US is currently attempting to make progress, primarily aiming to transform Damascus into a structure that does not threaten Israel’s security. Consequently, through their efforts to stabilise Syria, there also seems to be a desire and plan to bring order to the Middle East. This is particularly true in terms of Turkey’s relations with Israel and the process of outsourcing its own Kurdish problem to Syria. Therefore, the issue is not only Syria’s internal affairs; the accounts of other actors with Syria must also be taken into consideration.
‘TURKEY WAS CONVINCED TO JOIN THE PROCESS’
Whenever we talk about the SDF, the conversation inevitably turns to the process in Turkey rather than Syria. Can the steps taken at the White House meeting regarding the integration of the SDF into the Damascus administration, which Turkey supports, be considered an important development in terms of the internal process?
Turkey is being told that this is positive, and here too, the same sentiment is being conveyed to the domestic public. The process of achieving a terror-free Turkey does not run parallel to Turkey’s perspective on the Kurds in Syria. This needs to be made clear; this is evident from Bahçeli’s statements to the threats and calls directed at the SDG. Today, the US is saying, since you are experiencing a peace process in Turkey, transfer this to Syria, follow a different method. Turkey first threatened the Kurds via Shara, and when the US stood up to this threat, it tried to create an atmosphere as if the problem in Turkey would disappear if the Kurds were integrated into the central government via their rapprochement with Damascus. In fact, Turkey was persuaded to join this process, and it was not easy. We can understand this from Hakan Fidan’s presence there, the unfolding of this process before his eyes, and the subsequent meeting between Mazlum Abdi and Barrack. Turkey appears to have abandoned the idea of military intervention against the Kurdish elements within the Shara administration, which joined the coalition against ISIS, and with whom they will now act together; more accurately, Turkey seems to have been persuaded to accept such a solution. Even if Turkey has been persuaded to accept this process and there are no problems for the next 15 years, this is ultimately a historical and cultural issue. Tomorrow, the demands of the Kurds in Syria will be back on the agenda, and perhaps even more strongly than today. Turkey believes it has solved the problem in Syria by postponing it. We can say that it has been persuaded that it has solved it.
Is the persuading actor Barrack, or more accurately, the US?
Yes, we need to talk about Trump’s persuasion. This persuasion package is not limited to Syria alone. It also concerns Hamas, Gaza and Israel. Turkey is being persuaded to work in harmony with its allies in US policy.
Barrack made a statement this Thursday, specifically thanking Turkey and Hakan Fidan. The topic was Syria, but in this statement he also mentioned Turkey’s assistance regarding the Lebanese border and Gaza. In Trump’s previous statements, there was also a very grateful reference to Turkey for the ceasefire in Gaza. We interpret Turkey’s role in the Middle East mainly through Syria, but should we talk more about the US-Turkey cooperation in Lebanon and Gaza?
Undoubtedly. The emphasis on Hamas and Gaza is more important than Lebanon. We cannot argue that Lebanon occupies a significant place in our foreign policy, but if you recall, in the statement you mentioned, Barrack said, ‘Damascus will now actively assist us in confronting and dismantling the remnants of ISIS, the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist networks.’ Hamas is an organisation that Turkey refers to as Kuvayi Milliye, the Revolutionary Guards are obviously related to Iran, and when we say Hezbollah, Lebanon comes to mind. Barrack refers to all of these as terrorist networks, groups that Turkey considers allies. There are two important points in this statement, one of which is this. It assigns Syria a task in the fight against Hamas, an organisation supported by Turkey. The second is that when referring to the Fidan-Shaybani-Rubio meeting, it emphasises the redefinition of Turkey-Syria-Israel relations, with the Israel part escaping the media’s attention. What does the redefinition of relations between these three countries mean? We understand the Israel-Syria relationship, military agreements, the Abraham Accords, etc. What does the redefinition of Turkey-Israel relations mean? This means that it is a sign of a process that goes beyond the Kurds in Syria.
THE PROCESS OF ALIGNING WITH THE US IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA
When we talk about Turkey-Israel relations, the different doctrines in Syria come to mind in today’s context. We also know that there is a regional power struggle between the two countries in Syria. Based on Barrack’s statement, what kind of dynamic will emerge that transcends the tensions we have known until now?
Turkey has realised that it must share its control over Shara in Syria with other countries. In this regard, it initially appears to be in alignment with the US. On the other hand, we also know that after Russia’s recent withdrawal from Damascus and the SDG’s efforts towards autonomy, Turkey has been trying to develop dialogue with Russia. Moreover, Egypt and the Gulf countries already have a perspective on Shara that involves the prevention of Turkey’s influence in some way; they do not want Turkey to control an Arab republic on its own, and Turkey has now recognised this, thinking that it can resolve its policy on the Kurds through integration with Damascus. This is literally a step backwards.
Secondly, Turkey changed its position on Hamas a month ago and made a U-turn. After the White House meeting, Erdoğan became the guarantor of Hamas signing the ceasefire. Thus, he ensured that the people we call Kuvayi Milliye, who we call the symbol of the free Palestinian resistance, signed the agreement Israel wanted. Trump calls it a ceasefire, but ultimately, it was an agreement approved by Netanyahu. Consequently, the government has reached a point where it acts entirely in line with the US, first in Syria and now in Palestine. They may portray this as a victory, but comparing it to their position a few months ago makes it easier to see that this is not the case. This will become clearer in the coming period, and perhaps the way will be paved for Turkey to make peace with Israel and Netanyahu.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled 7 Ekim’in 2. Evresinde: Türkiye-İsrail ilişkilerinde yeni dönem, published in BirGün newspaper on November 16, 2025.
